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2.-------------------------------
Should I be legally as well as ethically
obligated to be my brother's keeper?
Should I be required, under threat of criminal
penalty, to give up my sunbathing and dive into an icy
lake to rescue a floundering swimmer, a task I am
eminently able to accomplish? Should I be coerced by
the same legal threat to warn a lone blind man,
proceeding without a cane, that he is on the verge of
plunging off the edge of a cliff to his certain death?
Cases such as these are not notably arguable
matters in ethical terms. A person with any pretension
to human decency ought to feel compelled to proffer
assistance when he or she can do so with such little
cost. Whether the criminal law should insist on such
behavior and punish failure to so act, however, is a
different and more complicated matter.
English and American law traditionally declare
that I ought not to be burdened and bothered with the
responsibility to aid another. As Peter Glazebrook
notes: "... an able-bodied Englishman may with
impunity watch a young child whose care he has not
undertaken drown at his feet in a foot of water. II1 The
operative principle of American law was cold-
bloodedly set forth by the Chief Justice of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court almost a century ago:
---------------·-3
Suppose A, standing close by a
railroad, sees a two-year-old babe on
the track and a car approaching. He
can easily rescue the child with entire
safety to himself. And the instincts of
humanity require him to do so. If he
does not, he may perhaps justly be
styled a ruthless savage and a moral
monster, but he is not liable in damage
for the child's injury or indictable under
the statutes for its death.2
An exception exists if the bystander has made
an initial effort to assist; then he must carry through.
He must also help those with whom he has a
preexisting relationship, such as a spouse or kin; and
those to whom he owes a contractual duty. This
territory of obligation has persistently been widened
by American appellate courts, but the fundamental
ground rule prevails: I am not to be legally forced to
concern myself with the woes of others, even when I
am able to do so easily.
The legal doctrine in the United States is that a
person compassionate or foolhardy enough to
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intervene becomes liable thereafter for the
consequences; absent such intervention he remains
juridically unassailable. Take, for instance, the
Zelenko case3, in which a woman collapsed in
Gimbel Brothers department store in New York City.
She was carried to the store infIrmary and left there
unattended for six hours. When she died, her heirs
sued the store and recovered. The appellate court
noted that the store and its employees had owed the
woman "no duty at all" and "could have let her be and
die." Responsibility was assumed by the store only
because of its "meddling in matters with which legally
it had no concern."
A few statutory exceptions do exist to this
laissez-faire approach. Since 1972, Vermont has
demanded that bystanders intervene. Its criminal code
states that "a person who knows that another is
exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent
that the same can be rendered without danger of peril
to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to
the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others." Those who follow this
prescript are to be exempt from civil liability unless
their action constitutes gross negligence or unless they
anticipated being paid for what they did. Minnesota
has enacted a similar law, while more recently,
Massachusetts decreed that persons on the site must
report crimes of violence, and Rhode Island declared
that they must notify the authorities of crimes of
sexual assault. These last two legislative acts came in
the wake of a notorious 1983 episode in ew
Bedford, Massachusetts, in which a woman was
raped by at least four men over the course of an hour,
while bystanders failed to intervene or to notify the
authorities.
The major arguments favoring a hands-off
approach to intervention are:
(1) Precise enunciation of a legal obligation to
rescue is a feckless endeavor. A century ago, for
instance, Lord MaCaulay, in discussing his proposed
draft of the Indian penal code, asked whether a
medical specialist should be required under threat of
criminal liability to travel from Calcutta to Meerut if
he alone could save a dying patient, and it could be
shown that he has ample time and resources to
undertake the journey. Similarly, Richard Epstein
questions whether, if a strong swimmer is to be held
criminally liable for failure to make an easy rescue,
another person will be similarly liable for failure to
donate $10 to African relief when he is substantially
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certain that the money will prevent a death through
starvation.4 Law professors have been particularly
imaginative in concocting permutations and
combinations of hypothetical circumstances that
should or should not be included in a satisfactory
law. Drafting such a law, some argue, poses a task
beyond satisfactory resolution. 5
(2) Attaching a criminal penalty for the
absence of altruism might redefine such behavior and
thereby diminish the number of what once had been
regarded as purely selfless actions.6
(3) Some libertarians maintain that duty-to-
rescue laws are "an exalted form of socialism"q and
that "it is a form of slavery to make one man serve
another."g
(4) Statutes demanding intervention, it is
claimed, would open up untoward opportunities for
false prosecutions. In France, for instance, a man
who had shot another was convicted both for willful
wounding and for failure to provide aid.9 Even more
disconcerting was the conviction in the same country
under its failure-to-aid law of a surgeon who refused
to perform a caesarean operation on the dead body of
a woman eight-months pregnant, 10
---------------7
(5) Laws proscribing assistance to those in
need would encourage bystanders to interfere
officiously and ineptly in situations where they ought
to remain passively on the sidelines. 11
(6) From the viewpoint of the administration
of criminal justice, it would prove difficult to sort out
the true malefactors if a considerable number of
persons, such as the 38 apathetic onlookers in the
notorious Kitty Genovese case, could in some degree
be implicated. How under such circumstances should
responsibility and criminal blame be fairly assessed?
(7) The tort implications of intervening
behavior pose dilemmas that make statutory action
questionable. Should, for instance, a person rescued
from drowning be liable for the support of the family
of her rescuer if he drowns while saving her? Should
a doctor who fails to provide aid be liable to the
second doctor who contacts a disabling disease when
she subsequently offers assistance? 12
Besides the foregoing issues, Antony Honore
senses in the age-old Anglo-American legal position
regarding the law's indifference to assistance for
those in jeopardy "a certain pride in the irrational,
incalculable depravity of the law." 13 But the most
fundamental ethical argument against criminalizing
g.--~---------------
failure-to-rescue has been stated by Herbert
Fingarette, who draws a sharp distinction between
personal morality (limy soul ") and legal demands
(Caesar's affairs) in the following terms:
...whether my soul is saved or not is
none of the state's business. Let
Caesar regulate his own affairs:
keeping the public order and the public
well-being. My soul is ~ affair. This
was Jesus' teaching; and it is also
central to our political tradition. 14
A contrary legal tradition, however, exists
throughout Europe. The Russian Criminal Code of
1845 was the first declaration by a major Western
jurisdiction of criminal liability for failure to assist
those in need. It was followed by similar provisions
in the criminal codes of Tuscany (1853), the
Netherlands (1881), and Italy (1889).
The present French provision on duty-to-
rescue nicely illustrates the ethical ambiguity that can
be associated with such statutes. Under pressure in
1941 from the German occupation authorities, who
had killed fifty hostages as reprisal for the murder of a
-~-----------~-----9
German officer, and who wanted French citizens to
report resistance activities, the Vichy government
decreed punishment for two kinds of offenders: (1)
those who failed to inform on would-be-criminals,
and (2) those who failed to bring or summon aid for
one in peril, if affirmative action did not involve risk
to the rescuer or to third parties, and if the failure to
act was causally related to the death or serious harm
of the imperiled person. The law was said to have
been unevenly applied, possibly because of the
distrust of German motives. But its second section
was reenacted after the liberation of France. The new
statute, however, dropped the provision that required
serious bodily harm or death before criminal liability
attached to the failure to act (Laws of 1945, Penal
Code, art. 63, s. 2). Similarly, the Germans retained
their failure-to-aid law, enacted by the Nazis in 1935,
though the phrase that the statute reflected the "social
solidarity of the people" was excised.l5
The French statute often has been invoked
against physicians who do not respond to calls from
those seeking emergency aid. Andre Tunc,
summarizing more than two decades of experience
with the law, notes that "in France, at least in my
10----·------------
opinion, the law ...acts as an incentive to everybody to
behave like a Good Samaritan," though he points out
that it would be interesting to know the facts behind
the numerical reports, which at the time he was
writing listed about 65 convictions annually, almost
all of them involving prison terms. 16
A CASE OF FATAL FORNICATION1?
Portugal, uncharacteristically for a European
nation, did not include a duty-to-aid provision in its
criminal law until 1982. Its statute now mirrors that
of France and Germany, though an earlier draft had
been more demanding, insisting on intervention from
anyone who was "in a position to prevent a criminal
offense without severe risk to himself, or without
omitting a duty of equal or greater importance." This
proposal was softened in the face of complaints by the
law revision commission that it was "too broad," and
"contrary to the prevailing ethical concepts of the
country."
To learn how the new law operates, and partly
in response to Tunc's call for case study material, in
1987 I sought detailed information in the fIrst half
dozen episodes that had been prosecuted. All but two
had involved traffIc matters, and primarily represented
------------------11
an early attempt to detennine how the law might mesh
with hit-and-run statutes. [In the United States, it
might be noted in passing, hit-and-run statutes run
roughshod over the constitutional protection against
self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment. They do
so on the patently flimsy ground that the privilege of
driving carries with it a reciprocal duty not to leave the
scene of an accident that you have caused.Jl8
These are the details of the most notable
Portuguese failure-to-aid case to the time: On
February 17, 1984, in a hamlet with perhaps 100
residents, located near the city of Alcoba~a, a 65 year-
old man invited to his house a 21 year-old woman
who lived nearby. The man, a retired carpenter, was
well-off by village standards. A hip operation had left
him unable to dress or undress himself. The young
woman was very poor, unattractive, and not very
bright.
The incapacitated man and his visitor
obviously agreed to some sexual arrangement. His
pants now off, the man suddenly became ill, and then
fainted. The woman, according to the court report,
"was perfectly aware that his condition was serious."
She took the unconscious man's wallet, containing a
small amount of money, a postal money order, and
12--,-----------~-.......".-
his identity card. She subsequently burned the card.
On her way out of the house, the woman also stole
some food from the refrigerator. As she was walking
back to her own house, she met a person who would
later testify that she never mentioned the condition of
the victim. The victim was found by a neighbor, who
had noticed the door of his house open, and went to
investigate. The man was taken to the hospital, where
he died four days later from the brain hemorrhage he
had suffered.
The offender was identified when she tried to
pass a bill in the village's only store. It was a crudely-
printed facsimile bank note of a kind sometimes sent
to people with advertisements, and the victim was
known to have had it in his wallet. The court
imposed the sternest sentence for violation of the
failure-to-aid law, though it carried a maximum of
only one year, compared to the three-year maximums
for the other offenses charged--theft, and destruction
of an official document (the identity card). The
composite sentence was payment of 30,000 escudos
(about $200) or 131 days in prison; payment of court
costs; and restitution of 10,000 escudos to anyone
entitled to make a claim.
The fact situation in this Portuguese case
resembles in some regards events surrounding the
""'----------13
death of Nelson Rockefeller, the former Vice
President of the United States. Rockefeller, 70 years-
old, died of a heart attack in January 1979 while in the
company of a young woman in his New York
apartment. She waited for an hour before telephoning
a friend, who in turn called the police. Since the
family refused to permit an autopsy, it never was
established whether Rockefeller's life might have
been saved by a more timely call for help.
Newpapers took what was an obviously prurient
interest in the case, leading The Nation to pinpoint a
significant ethical ingredient of the episode: "The real
issue," The Nation insisted editorially, "has to do
with whether public figures have a right to minimal
private lives or, in this case, to a private death."
Details of the Rockefeller case, it was insisted,
involved a "minimalist zone of privacy." 19
Should failure-to-aid, as represented by the
Portuguese case and the Rockefeller experience,
dictate that an ethical principle be translated into a
legal imperative, or should considerations of privacy
and personal choice be allowed to prevail? The
victim, of course, has no opportunity to record a
retroactive opinion, but presumably in the
overwhelming number of cases, he would like to get
14
as much help in as timely a manner as possible,
despite the price his reputation may have to pay. The
to-be-offender undoubtedly would prefer in most
instances to protect her "good name," and might argue
that the emergency was not of her own creation, and
therefore ought not be her responsibility; or, if it is,
she ought at least to be allowed to retain her
anonymity. And, more basically, there must remain
some doubt about whether the behavior of the
participants would have been altered by existence of a
criminal statute demanding that aid be provided.
The more relaxed moral ethos of our day
mutes somewhat one issue involved in these particular
kinds of cases; celebrity and fortune rather than shame
and humiliation seem to await the Donna Rices and
Jessica Hahns of today, if not the Gary Harts. All
told, the chance to save a life undoubtedly should be
given precedence over the opportunity to hold private
affairs private.
BALANCING ETIllCAL AND LEGAL
CONCERNS
My field work indicated that the relatively
recent Portuguese law requiring persons to provide
aid in emergencies when they might reasonably do so
without undue danger to themselves seemed to be
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quite workable; and the evidence indicated that it has
not been used for nefarious purposes, though, as the
examples from France indicate, that potentiality
certainly inheres in any failure-to-aid law.
The other ethical and legal objections noted
earlier might be met by the following points:
(1) Legal analysts make their living and their
reputations by ingeniously locating reasons why
something won't or shouldn't work, and why what
seems reasonably simple is a good deal more
convoluted than people might otherwise imagine.
European jurisdictions uniformly, and for
significantly long periods of time, have found that
penal laws punishing failure-to-aid are workable
provisions.
Nobody, Lord Macaulay notwithstanding,
would desire to criminally fault the physician who
failed to undertake the journey from Calcutta to
Meerut, however unencumbered he might be at the
moment. If the same doctor refused to offer
assistance to a person bleeding to death as a result of
an automobile accident within sight of his front
window, because he did not want to interrupt a dinner
party, many of us might believe that he ought to have
to answer to the criminal law for such callousness.
John Kleinig has aptly noted that omissions under law
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constitute a restricted subclass of nondoings.
Omissions are attached to omitters, he points out, in a
way that mere nondoings are not: we do not blame
Prince Charles or Sophia Loren or an isolated Eskimo
for the failure to rescue the victim outside the doctor's
window, but only the person who sensibly could
have rendered aid.20
(2) That imperatives imposed by the threat of
criminal prosecution would eviscerate the moral
grandeur of altruism, and that such statutes might
diminish the number of altruistic actions, seems far-
fetched and quite unlikely. Ethical actions performed
anonymously, with no prospect of reward and no
likelihood of condemnation--actions such as those of
the biblical Good Samaritan ~ 1O:29-36)--are
devoutly to be desired, but the carrot and stick of legal
standards are precisely useful where the norms of the
society begin to fail. If nothing else, a failure-to-aid
law indicates the kind of behavior that a society
endorses and the kind of indifference to others that it
deplores.
(3) To say that such laws do disservice to
liberty and force humans to subordinate their
individuality to the requirements of others is to
repudiate the interdependent nature of all human
existence. As A. D. Woozley has noted: "Any new
law at all is some restriction on liberty, but not all
restrictions are threats to it."2l Laws demanding
responsible action in emergencies, as Kleinig notes,
are concerned with the harm that comes from "eroding
those fundamental social relations on which our
individual welfare ultimately depends. ,,22
(4) All laws can be abused, but there seems
no reason why a failure-to-aid statute would be
applied malevolently and unreasonably any more than
any other statute is so used. That Al Capone was
handed a draconian sentence on an income tax evasion
charge because the government was unable to nail him
for his more barbaric acts is hardly an argument
against the imposition of criminal penalties for tax
fraud: it only warns that power can and will be
abused, and that it is necessary to monitor the use of
power as best as possible so that such abuse is
minimized.
(5) That a failure-to-aid statute will tum us
into a nation of inept meddlers and vicious vigilantes
also appears to represent more of a sophistical point
than a realistic assessment of the impact of a law that
seems at most likely to have a marginal (though
important) impact on the way people behave, and a
strong impact on the way that the social system
presents itself, setting out those things for which it
stands.
(6) Sorting out malefactors is a task that the
criminal justice system routinely undertakes, and there
is no reason to anticipate that it would have much
difficulty in doing the same under a failure-to-aid law.
Take the Genovese case, for example. The crime
took place in Kew Gardens, on the outskirts of New
York City, at about 3 o'clock in the morning on
March 13, 1964. Ms. Genovese was knifed in the
back as she tried to run from her automobile to the
shelter of a nearby apartment building entryway. She
screamed :"Help me! Help me! Oh, God, he's
stabbed me." A neighbor leaned from his window
and yelled: "Let that girl alone!" The assailant turned
and ran from the scene.
Kitty Genovese then staggered about thirty
yards, seeking sanctuary inside one of the nearby
doors. Ten minutes passed before her assailant
returned to the site and began to hunt down his
victim. When he finally located Ms. Genovese, he
slashed her brutally with his knife, then raped her.
Of the 38 persons later located who admitted
having heard her cries for help, the most culpable
clearly was a male friend of the victim who apparently
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had stood at the top of the stairs and had seen her
killed, without doing a thing. He thereafter
telephoned friends asking their advice, and finally
walked across the building rooftop so that he could
use another person's telephone to call the police,
because he wanted to avoid being identified and
involved. The murderer, when later apprehended,
was asked how he had dared to return to the scene
after fleeing it: "I knew they wouldn't do anything,"
he said. "People never do. ,,23
From a prosecutor's viewpoint, it would seem
reasonable to go after the most egregious violators,
especially since an especially strong element of the
law being invoked is its character as an ethical
statement.
(7) Finally, as with the criminal law, courts
and juries have sufficient experience and wit to sort
out the tort implications of diverse scenarios that
could be involved in passage of a duty-to-aid law.
There may be transient difficulties and tinkering with
details may be required, but the issue hardly seems so
insurmountable that it ought to scuttle what otherwise
would be a desirable translation of an ethical matter
into a legal statement.
20----·----------
CONCLUSION
Whatever its roots--whether they are planted
in the soil of capitalism or the individualist ethos of
the frontier--it seems that the indifference of American
criminal law to failure-to-aid represents an outdated
doctrine. That the law has not been altered so that it
conforms more closely with ethical dictates probably
is a consequence of inertia as much or more than any
deeply-held ideological values. Some feminist
jurisprudents now insist that the no-duty-to-aid
position represents a quintessential example of a
masculine attitude that is "devoid of care and
responsiveness to the safety of others," and
unresponsive to "other's needs and hurts. ,,24 Like
many other chauvinistic doctrines built upon
toughness and self-reliance, they regard this one as
anachronistic.
From the evidence available, there do not
appear to be overriding practical objections to
enactment of failure-to-aid criminal provisions in
Anglo-American law. Nonetheless, it is obvious that
the drafters and the enforcers would need to exercise
due care to make certain that such laws produce as
much good as possible, with a minimum diminution
of an individual's right to protect himself or herself
-------------------21
from a criminal label when the omission occurred for
decent, or at least arguably decent reasons. Henry
Foster's rule-of-thumb seems an appropriate
guideline: "only egregious examples of wanton
indifference should be subject to the law's clumsy
sanctions. ,,25 All matters considered, there seems
little doubt that failure-to-aid laws make reasonable
ethical demands upon what, in the evocative French
phrase, constitutes "egoisme excessif."
22------ ---------
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for the Study of Ethics in Society. 
Name _________________________________ _ 
Mailing Address _____________ _ 
Institutional Affiliation _________ _ 
====================================== 
Send to: Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 
Western Michigan University 
Kalamazoo, Ml 49008 
The Center publishes papers of interest to its 
readers. Distribution is free to members. 
Additional copies may be obtained for $2.00 by 
writing to the Center. 
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